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UNITED STATES V. BECHTEL
CORPORATION: ANTITRUST AND
THE ARAB BLACKLIST
In January 1977, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Bechtel Corporation entered a proposed final settlement of the antitrust suit' filed by the United States one year
earlier. The complaint had charged that Bechtel, one of the world's
largest construction firms, and four of its affiliates, had implemented the Arab League boycott of Israel and of "pro-Israeli"
domestic firms. 2 This settlement of the Antitrust Division's first
attack on the thirty-year-old Arab boycott has resulted in a consent accord which outlines a permissible course of conduct for
United States firms seeking trade with the Arab world, but leaves
unanswered a broad range of antitrust issues sure to be raised in
subsequent private suits.3 This note will examine and attempt to
resolve several of the issues raised in the Bechtel suit, and in addition, will examine the course of conduct licensed by the consent
accord.
I.

BACKGROUND-THE Boycor

The Arab boycott was initiated in 1946, when several Arab
League4 countries organized a boycott of products manufactured
by "Zionist" entities. The boycott was broadened in 1951 and 1952
to include those persons and firms conducting commercial relations with Israel or otherwise supporting Israel's economic development. 5 To coordinate the boycott, the Arab League countries established a Central Boycott Office in Damascus, Syria.' The Arab
1. United States v. Bechtel Corp., No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976),
747

ANTITRUST

& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-8 (Jan. 20, 1976), consent decree

proposed, 796 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1 (Jan. 10, 1977).
2. Complaint, United States v. Bechtel Corp., No. C-76-99, [hereinafter cited
as Complaint] reprinted in 747 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1 (Jan.
20, 1976).

3. See Freedman Seating Co. v. General Motors, Corp., No. 76-C-197 (N.D.
Ill., filed Jan. 19, 1976).
4. The Arab League nations are: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, People's Republic of Yemen,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates
(including Abu Dhabi and Dubai) and Yemen Arab Republic. See Complaint,
supra note 2, para. 3.

5.

Complaint, supra note 2, para. 14.

6.

Hearings on DiscriminatoryArab Pressure on U.S. Business Before the
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League Council, a management committee of representatives from
the twenty member nations, sets boycott policy for the confederated organization through legislative resolutions, suggests implementing interpretations, and polices the boycott through a commercial espionage network geared to investigate suspected violations.7 These collective actions, although influential, do not carry
the force of law within the member countries. Consequently, the
boycott remains only loosely centralized, with each country defining and enforcing the boycott through its own governmental structure.'
The primary target of the boycott is, of course, Israel. The boycott has assumed larger proportions by adding secondary and even
tertiary targets, namely, all individuals and firms regarded by the
Arab League as "operating in support of Israel."' The notable feature of this secondary boycott is the notorious "blacklist" which
catalogues all such "pro-Israeli" entities. The objective is to bar
all trading between League countries or their nationals and foreign
firms that maintain proscribed types of commercial relations with
Israel. In furtherance of this objective, the League's member governments require foreign firms trading with Arab clients to complete detailed questionnaires and to certify that their conduct is
consistent with the boycott."0 Generally, boycott policy prohibits
establishment of a commercial installation in Israel, significant
investment in Israeli firms, and service as an agent of Israeli business.I Most significantly, it seeks to exclude foreign-manufactured
products that include components produced by blacklisted firms.
Thus, an American firm with no Israeli ties may be barred from
exporting its products to the Arab world if such products incorpoSubcomm. on InternationalTrade and Commerce of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bingham

Hearings].
7. Hearingson Multinational Corporationsand United States ForeignPolicy
Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporationsof the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 442-44 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Church Hearings]. See generally Hearingson S.425, Amendment No. 24 Thereto
S.953, S.995, & S.1303 Before the Subcomm. on InternationalFinance of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Stevenson Hearings].
8. Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 213; Stem, On and Off the Arabs' List,
NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 27, 1976, at 9."

9. Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 449.
10. See id. at 372, 449-69; Schwartz, The Arab Boycott and AmericanResponses: Antitrust Law or Executive Discretion,54 Tnx. L. Rsv. 1260, 1263-64 (1976).
11. ChurchHearings, supra note 7, at 442-76.
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rate components produced, for example, by a firm with an office
in Israel.'2 Various renderings of the blacklist fix the American
segment at anywhere from 1,500 to 1,800 firms, 3 including goliaths
such as General Motors, National Broadcasting Company, Burlington Industries, Republic Steel, Pratt & Whitney Corporation,
and Xerox."
Interpretations of boycott principles reportedly vary from one
Arab country to another, and enforcement is often spotty.'5 That
American business, loath to overlook the potential of the Mid-East
market, has heeded the principles of the once largely symbolic
boycott is, however, beyond dispute. Whether the blacklist is "an
attempt to undermine Israel" or "an attempt to inject antisemitism into Western business," 6 the Israelis at least claim that the
boycott is responsible for changing investment patterns in that
country. 7
II.

UNITED STATES PoLIcY

Until late 1975, the de facto policy of the United States toward
the Boycott could be characterized as one of condonation, in seem-

ing disregard of the Export Administration Act of 1969,18 which
declared a congressional purpose
to oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed
by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the United
States, [and] to encourage and request domestic concerns engaged
in the export of articles, materials, supplies or information, to refuse

12. Id. at 449-53.
13. Steiner, InternationalBoycotts and Domestic Order: American Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 54 Tax. L. Rsv. 1355, 1363 (1976). Compare
Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 195 with Stevenson Hearings,supra note 7, at
178.
14. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1264-65.
15. See Guzzardi, That Curious Barrieron the Arab Frontiers,FORTUNE, July
1975, at 82, 168. See also Letter from Roderick Hills, Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman, to Representative Benjamin Rosenthal (June 1, 1976),
reprintedinHearings on Effectiveness of FederalAgencies' Enforcement of Laws
and PoliciesAgainst Compliance, by Banks and Other U.S. Firms, With the Arab
Boycott, Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs
of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-50
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Rosenthal Hearings].
16. See Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1975, at 8, col. 1, quoted in Stevenson Hearings,
supra note 7, at 178.
17. Wall St. J., March 25, 1975, at 20, col. 2.
18. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2402(5) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (expired Sept. 1976).
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to take any action, including the furnishing of information and the
signing of agreements, which has the effect of furthering or supporting the restrictive trade practices or boycotts ....
11
The statute, however, merely encouraged noncompliance with the
boycott. In implementing the Act, the Commerce Department required only that domestic firms report any compliance requests;
the forms drafted for this purpose explained that compliance was
not illegal."0 In fact, whatever subtle discouragement of compliance
was effected through these reports was largely offset by the Department's continued circulation of trade opportunity notices2 originating in compliance-demanding Arab countries. A dramatic example of the Administration's efforts to shield complying firms
was provided by Commerce Secretary Rogers C.B. Morton's appearance before the Moss Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 2 Secretary Morton refused to disclose the names of reporting firms on the ground that to do so "might expose [boycotting
firms] to economic pressures and counter boycotts by certain domestic groups." Threatened with a contempt citation, Morton
relented, exacting in return a Subcommittee pledge of strict confidentiality.
The Administration executed a sharp policy change in November 1975, when President Gerald R. Ford ordered the Commerce
Secretary to "prohibit U.S. exporters and related service organizations from answering or complying in any way with boycott requests that would cause discrimination against U.S. citizens or
firms on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."24
In exercising his discretionary powers under the Export Administration Act, the President pledged to give "bigotry no sanction, '"
but studiously avoided mention of the Arab League, or of any
particular boycott, focusing instead on "foreign boycott prac19. Id.
20. U.S. Dep't of Commerce Form DTB-621. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at
1270 & n.58.
21. Id. at 1270.
22. See Hearings on Contempt ProceedingsAgainst Secretary of Commerce,
Rogers C.B. Morton, Before the Subcomm. on Oversightand Investigations of the
House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Moss Hearings].
23. N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1975, at 4, col. 5.
24. Statement by President Ford, 11 WEEKLY COMP. oF PREs. Doc. 1305, 1306
(Nov. 20, 1975).
25. Id. at 1305.
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tices." 21 However, the Ford Administration continued to oppose
the antiboycott legislation proposed by the opposition party.
III.

UNITED STATES V. BECHTEL CORPORATION

The Justice Department filed a civil antitrust suit" against the
Bechtel Corporation and four of its affiliates on January 16, 1976.
The complaint charged the San Francisco-based heavyconstruction concern with boycott compliance, which allegedly effected concerted refusal to deal with blacklisted companies in
connection with Arab projects." The complaint also charged that
9
Bechtel demanded similar compliance from its subcontractors.
The government claimed that the actions of Bechtel resulted in
suppression of United States competition in export trade, denied
United States firms freedom of choice in selecting subcontractors,
and constituted a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." The
complaint sought to enjoin defendants from implementing the alleged concerted refusal to deal.
Bechtel answered 3' with some dozen defenses, the most notable
of which were as follows:
(1) no Sherman Act "combination or agreement" can be
found where the alleged collaboration was with "immune"
foreign governments;
(2) both Bechtel and its Arab customers have the right to
"select" those with whom they will deal, and all such selections were unilaterally made;
(3) Sherman Act proscriptions extend only to commerciallymotivated boycotts, and not to those political or religious in
nature; and
(4) Bechtel was merely complying with the commercial laws
of a foreign sovereign and was thus immune.
However, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California apparently will not try the issues raised by the
Bechtel parties in view of the fact that a consent accord3 2 was
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
United States v. Bechtel Corp., No. C-76-99.
Complaint, supra note 2, para. 21.

Id.

Id. paras. 20, 23.
Defendant's Answer, United States v. Bechtel Corp., No. C-76-99
[hereinafter cited as Answer], reprinted in 762 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) F-1 (May 4, 1976).
32. 796 ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Final Judgment].
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proposed on January 10, 1977. The accord recognizes the right of
Arab nations to decide from what sources they will buy while imposing some restrictions on the extent to which Bechtel may facilitate these choices. The lengthy document details the ground rules
for United States-Arab trade and thereby embodies the first official statement of antitrust policy on the subject. The accord restrains Bechtel from "implementing" the boycott within the
United States,3 3 but substantially qualifies this prohibition with a
series of provisions and interpretations. The consent accord, even
when finalized," does not extinguish the legal issues surrounding
the Arab Boycott, and is in fact inadmissible in a subsequent suit
against Bechtel or any other defendant." At least one private suit
arising out of the boycott has already been filed,37 and others can
be expected. These actions will undoubtedly revive some of the
same antitrust issues raised by the aborted Bechtel suit. These
issues are best examined by focusing on the Bechtel facts.

IV.

THE ARAB BOYCOTT AS A CONCERTED REFUSAL TO DEAL

In order to establish that boycott actions constitute a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act, complainant must prove that
defendant's actions constituted a group boycott, that is, a
"combination or conspiracy" in unreasonable restraint of interstate or foreign commerce." The conventional rule is that proof of
a concerted refusal to deal establishes a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.39 Under the Bechtel facts, the complainant will have
substantiated the allegations of a refusal to deal simply by showing
that the defendants, in connection with Arab construction projects, have refused to accept or consider the bids of otherwise qualified subcontractors who are themselves blacklisted or who trade
with blacklisted firms.4" Proof of such conduct, however, does not
33.

Id. § IV(A).

34. Id. § V.
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1976).
36. Id. § 16(h). See Kestenbaum, AmBOYcorr BULL. at 23 (Feb. 1977).
37. See Freedman Seating Co. v. General Motors Corp., No. 76-C-197.
38. Section 1 prohibits "every contract, combination ...
or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
39. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966);

United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Klor's Inc. v. BroadwayHale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
40. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
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establish a Sherman Act violation since "refusals to sell, without
more, do not violate the law." 4 ' While it is true that concerted
refusals to deal fall within the proscriptions of the antitrust laws,

a unilateral refusal is merely the exercise of a trader's
"independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal," and
constitutes no Sherman Act violation." The Supreme Court's
clearest articulation of this principle, grounded in traditional notions of freedom of contract, is in United States v. Colgate & Co."
In Colgate, the Court was faced with a resale price maintenance
scheme effected through defendant manufacturer's policy of refusing to sell to price-cutters. The Court found no Sherman Act violation in the absence of any "agreement" to implement the scheme
between Colgate and the complying dealers."
Illustrative of trade practices held to constitute a concerted refusal to deal is Fashion OriginatorsGuild of America v. FTC.4 The
defendants there argued that the dress-making industry was being
undermined by "style pirates," manufacturers who copied original
dress designs and sold the copies at reduced prices. In an attempt
to curb this practice, original designers formed the Fashion Originators Guild, and agreed to refuse to sell to retailers who also sold
garments copied from a Guild member's designs. The Supreme
Court, stressing the Guild's elaborate enforcement structure, held
that the "style piracy" campaign constituted a concerted refusal
to deal and thus was a Sherman Act violation." The combination
in the Fashion Originatorscase was express, and the anticompetitive purpose clear. In cases presenting less classic examples of
private combinations," courts have also found a concerted refusal
to deal, and have even inferred the requisite conspiracy element.48
41. Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953). See
generally Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the FederalAntitrust Laws, 103 U. PA.
L. REv. 847, 861 (1955).
42. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). See also United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967) (dictum).
43. 250 U.S. 300.
44. Id. Note however that the Court has imposed important limitations on the
Colgate doctrine. Lack of an express exclusionary agreement is no bar to a finding
of Sherman Act liability. See cases cited note 48 infra.
45. 312 U.S. 457.
46. Id.
47. The Court detailed defendant's elaborate espionage network and its
multi-tiered system of trial and appellate tribunals. Id. at 462-65.
48. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
(1968); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1960); United States v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Loraine Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143
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THE CONSPIRACY ELEMENT

In a suit against Bechtel or another boycott defendant, the crucial question will be not so much whether there has been a refusal
to deal with blacklisted firms, but whether these refusals were part
of a combination or conspiracy to exclude such firms. The Antitrust Division apparently designed the Bechtel complaint to support three theories of the combination underlying Bechtel's commercial dealings with Arab entities, any one of which a court might
adopt in finding a concerted refusal to deal. It is submitted that
each of these theories poses significant problems for either the
government in an enforcement action or for a private litigant.
A.

PreexistingArab Conspiracy

The Bechtel complaint alleges that Bechtel "entered into and
implemented in the United States a combination and conspiracy
which resulted in an unreasonable restraint of. . . commerce."4
The government evidently had hoped to show that Bechtel joined
a preexisting combination between the Arab League nations and
Bechtel's clients, Arab business concerns. The immediate difficulty with this theory is that the horizontal segment of the preexisting arrangement is outside the scope of domestic antitrust jurisdiction because of foreign governmental involvement. It has been
noted that premising the requisite conspiracy element on an alleged combination between a domestic defendant and an exempt
foreign sovereign is a "novel" approach." The novelty of such a
combination undermines the suitability of this theory as a framework for establishing the requisite conspiracy.
Apart from this impediment, however, the international conspiracy theory raises an international conflict of laws question since
the asserted combination exists, if at all, by virtue of foreign governmental action. The Supreme Court recently stated that the act
of state doctrine, in substance a choice of law rule, "precludes the
courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of public acts
a recognized foreign sovereign committed within its own terri(1951); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); Eastman
Kodak

Co. v. Southern Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).

49. Complaint, supra note 2, para. 20.
50. Kestenbaum, The Antitrust Challenge to the Arab Boycott: Per Se
Theory, Middle East Politics, and United States v. Bechtel Corporation, 54 TFx.
L. REv. 1411, 1418 (1976). But see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
549 F.2d 597 (1976).
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tory." 51 If the outcome of the issues in a given case turns upon the
act of a foreign sovereign within its own territory, United States
courts will not inquire into the legality of that act and will instead
52
recognize its validity regardless of domestic laws.
The act of state doctrine is well-illustrated by OccidentalPetroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.5" The Sheikh of Umm al
Q, wayn, one of the Trucial States,5 4 granted the plaintiff an exclusive concession to extract and sell oil in the sheikdom. Defendant held a similar concession from the Sheikh of Sharjah, an
adjacent sheikdom. Having discovered that an area of plaintiff's
concession contained surprisingly rich oil deposits, defendants allegedly induced the Sheikh of Sharjah to assert sovereignty over
the oil-laden territory. When the Sheikh of Umm al Qaywayn
acceded to the neighboring Sheikh's assertion, the area in dispute
fell within the defendants' concession. Defendants interposed the
act of state doctrine as a defense to allegations of a conspiracy to
"catalyze" the actions of the foreign sovereign in violation of the
Sherman Act. The court dismissed the antitrust suit, agreeing with
the defendants that a trial on the merits would require it to assess
the propriety of the acts of another sovereign committed within
that sovereign's jurisdiction.
In view of the holding in Occidental that the alleged international anticompetitive conspiracy was not appropriate for domestic judicial inquiry, a Sherman Act complaint which relies on a
combination between domestic defendants and foreign sovereigns
for the conspiracy element is troublesome.
B.

ConspiracyAmong Competing Non-Arab Firms

A second conspiracy theory suggested by the Bechtel complaint
51. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964), quoted
in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1975).
52. See generally, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398; American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 312 U.S. 347 (1909); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250 (1897).
53. Joelson & Griffin, The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels Under United
States Antitrust and Public InternationalLaw, 9

Lr'L

LAW. 617, 631 (1975); see

Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682; First National
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428, 431-34, 436-37; 6 M. WMTEMAN, DIGEST OF
1-54 (1968); Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollection in
Tranquility,6 COLUM. J. TRASNAT'L L. 175 (1967).

INTERNATIONAL LAW

54. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
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assumes a horizontal combination among non-Arab private concerns," American and otherwise, as a result of their respective
agreements with the Arab clients to conform to and implement the
boycott. It might not be necessary to demonstrate direct contact
and collusion among competing firms to prove this horizontal combination, for courts may infer such a combination. 6
In Interstate Circuit,Inc. v. United States, 57 the Supreme Court
declared that it is "enough that, knowing that concerted action
was contemplated . . . , the [competing firms] gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it." 58 The evidence in
Interstate Circuit showed that two affiliated Texas film exhibitors
had circulated among eight film distributors, controlling seventyfive percent of the market, a written proposal that each distributor
grant the exhibitors exclusive rights to first run films in the area.
In return, the exhibitors would agree to maintain a premium admission price. Each of the distributors, ostensibly independently,
accepted. In finding a conspiracy, the Court examined the
"unilateral" decisions of the distributors, noting that: (1) all eight
knew that each had received the same proposal; (2) all the distributors had made major and complex alterations in their contracts
with the exhibitors, resulting in uniform agreements between the
exhibitors and each of the distributors; and (3) the scheme would
fail unless all eight agreed.59
In a subsequent case, the Court demonstrated that no conspiracy will be inferred in the absence of a strong motive for concerted
action. In Theatre Enterprises,Inc. v. ParamountFilm Distributing Corp.,6" a theatre owner charged that several film distributors
had acted pursuant to a combination to restrain trade in denying
him first-run exhibition rights. The plaintiff could prove no direct
contact among the defendants, and the Supreme Court refused to
infer an agreement from the parallel conduct of the distributors,
citing evidence of valid business reasons for individual refusals to
deal with the plaintiff.6' It is generally agreed that paraliel conduct
will not support the inference of a conspiracy, absent a demonstration that the decisions of the actors were interdependent.6 2 Only
55.
56.
57.
58.

The Trucial States are now known as the United Arab Emirates.
Complaint, supra note 2, para. 19.
See cases cited note 48 supra.
306 U.S. 208.

59. Id. at 226.
60. Id. at 226-27.
61. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
62. Id.
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where the parallelism characterizing the activities of a group of
competitors would be difficult to achieve absent some agreement
will a conspiracy be inferred.
The Bechtel complaint alleges that the defendants "knew of the
existence" of the "well-known and generally recognized. . . aforesaid Arab Boycott." 3 It was clearly within the individual interest
of Bechtel and each of its competitors to comply with the policies
of the Arab boycott since this was a prerequisite to doing business
in the Arab world. Further, the interdependence of decision making required by Interstate Circuit is not present in the Bechtel
facts. In Interstate Circuit, the refusal of even a single distributor
to adopt the exclusive first-run proposal could have destroyed the
effectiveness of the anticompetitive scheme. In such a situation,
the inference of a conspiracy is appropriate. On the other hand, the
competitive position of Bechtel vis-a-vis the Arab world deteriorates as its competitors submit to Arab boycott demands. Thus,
the compliance decisions of Bechtel and its competitors were
independent rather than interdependent.Inference of a combination among these competitors is decidedly inappropriate.
C.

Coercion by Bechtel of its Subcontractors

The final combination theory proposed by the Bechtel complaint
relies on a finding that Bechtel has imposed trading restrictions on
its subcontractors and thus effected a horizontal combination at
that level. 4 The evil perceived in such an arrangement is that it
undermines the freedom of the subcontractor to choose his trading
partners.6 5 This theory rests heavily on the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-HaleStores, Inc. 66 and
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co."7 These cases illustrate that
whether the arrangement is effected by vertical pressure from one
level of traders downward to the next, or by an "understanding"
among the firms on the lower level, it constitutes a Sherman Act
conspiracy if it impairs trader discretion.
The plaintiff in Klor's, a small appliance retailer, charged that
a large chain of retailers, Broadway-Hale Stores, had induced ten
leading appliance manufacturers to cease dealing with the plain63. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. Rsv. 655, 658 (1962).
64. Complaint, supra note 2, para. 19.
65. Id. para. 21.
66. 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 799, 808 (1976).

67. 359 U.S. 207.
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tiff. Noting Broadway-Hale's position of market dominance, the
Court found a conspiracy among the manufacturers and the defendant Broadway-Hale.
The Court in Parke, Davis invalidated a manufacturer's retail
maintenance program. Distinguishing Colgate, the Court found
that the defendant manufacturer had gone far beyond the announcement of its trading terms. 8 Instead, Parke, Davis had used
"subterfuge" to coerce its distributors and retailers into a prohibited vertical combination. By distinguishing Colgate, the Court in
Parke, Davis demonstrated that the unilateral refusal to deal remains outside the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. If a trader
desires to deal in a certain product and freely accedes to the manufacturer's announced terms, the resultant arrangement is protected by the Colgate doctrine. The Court reaffirmed this principle
in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,"9 indicating that a non-coercive plan to
exclude competitors establishes no prohibited combination if all
adherents willingly participate.
Establishing coercion will be largely a factual matter. Although
the Bechtel complaint alleges that Bechtel "require[d] [its]
Subcontractors to refuse to deal with Blacklisted Persons,"7 there
are no further allegations to indicate that Bechtel did anything
more than announce its trading terms. Moreover, there is a strong
suggestion that Bechtel's subcontractors acted in their own selfinterest in accepting Bechtel's terms.
Thus, had Bechtel gone to trial, to proceed under a Bechtelsubcontractor combination theory, the Government would have
been required to prove both: (1) that Bechtel demanded its subcontractors cease dealing with blacklisted firms, and (2) that these
subcontractors did so unwillingly, and only in the face of coercion
by Bechtel. The same burden would be imposed today in a renewed effort by the Antitrust Division or in a private suit. It would
seem impossible, however, to establish this conspiracy theory if
Bechtel or another boycott defendant remains within the guidelines of the proposed consent accord. The accord assumes that
Bechtel will accept all bids and exert no pressure whatsoever."
VI.

CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL-ILLEGAL PER SE?

Although the Supreme Court has generally applied a rule of per
68.

362 U.S. 29.

69. Id. at 36-47.
70. 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (dictum).
71. Complaint, supra note 2, para. 21.
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se illegality to group boycotts, 72 that inflexible standard has in
some cases given way to considerations of public policy. In such
circumstances, the Court has adopted a rule of reason and made
detailed inquiry into the purposes and effects of such boycotts, and
considered justifications for them.73
Similarly, the lower federal courts have undermined the notion
that all group boycotts are illegal per se. The trend in these courts
is to limit the per se rule to boycotts with clearly demonstrable
anticompetitive purposes.74 The line of cases suggest that the "rule
of reason may be applicable to boycotts involving competitors
' '75
where the motives for exclusion are not directly profit related.
This trend was begun by the Supreme Court itself in White Motor
Co. v. United States, 78 where the Court reviewed a summary judgment in a case involving franchising contracts between a manufacturer and its dealer. The Court, never having considered verticallyimposed territorial restrictions, refused to apply a per se rule, noting:
We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of
which these arrangements emerge to be certain. They may be too
dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable protections against
aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company has for breaking into or staying in business and within the
"rule of reason." We need to know more than we do about the actual
impact of these arrangements on competition to decide whether
they have such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack...
any redeeming virtue" and therefore should be classified as per se
77
violations of the Sherman Act.
72.

Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 32, § IV(F).

73. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127.
74. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
75. See, e.g., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc.,
485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); E.A. McQuade
Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tyson's Comer
Regional Shopping Center, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Jos. E. Seagram & Sons
v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1062 (1970). See also Note, A Re-Examination of the Boycott Per Se Rule
in Antitrust Law, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 126, 148 (1974); Coons, Non-CommercialPurpose
as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U. L. REv. 705 (1962).
76. Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tyson's Comer Regional Shopping Center, 429 F.2d
at 208.
77. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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The circuit courts have inferred from White Motor that a per se
rule is inappropriate where "the very novelty and complexity of the
questions indicate that they should [be] resolved only after a full
trial.""8 In Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. NationalBankAmericard
Inc., the restrictive membership plan of a bank credit card system
was held not to constitute an illegal per se concerted refusal to
deal. The Worthen court reversed a summary judgment, reasoning
as in White Motor, that "the novelty and importance of the question was the determining factor in applying the rule of reason .. .-79
The propriety of Bechtel's refusal to deal with blacklisted domestic firms in connection with Arab projects is a novel, complex,
and important issue. The Bechtel facts are unique in that the
motives behind the Arab boycott cannot be categorized neatly as
"directly profit related."" As noted earlier, it can be said that
domestic firms charged with boycott compliance are not motivated
by an intent to exclude any domestic subcontractor. Rather, these
firms have independently opted to comply with the trading terms
announced by their Arab clients, and are thus acting within the
protection of the Colgate doctrine. Further, although the express
Arab motive in exacting these terms is to exclude certain domestic
subcontractors, the Arab objective is not commercial, but political.
In fact, the Arab clients have sacrificed the commercial advantages which normally accrue from increased bidder competition,
choosing instead to exclude certain bidders on political grounds.
Consideration of the Arab purpose in imposing these restrictions,
and the motive of American business in complying, highlights the
absence of a plausible and established conspiracy theory essential
for a per se refusal to deal claim. Moreover, this politicallymotivated boycott, not directly profit related, stems from the actions of foreign sovereigns. Hence, the competing considerations in
the act of state doctrine serve to complicate the issues presented
by the Arab trade restrictions.
Ultimately, the issue in an antitrust challenge to the Arab boycott is the extent to which domestic firms will be permitted to
engage in foreign trade. The complexities of the Arab boycott are
apparent, and the importance of American presence in burgeoning,
78.

Id. at 263 (citations omitted).

79. Worthen Bank &Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d at

126 (citing Department of Justice amicus brief).

80. Id.
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vital foreign markets is indisputable. Bearing in mind the Supreme
Court's statement that "only after considerable experience with
certain business relationships will courts classify them as per se
violations," it is clear that a domestic firm's boycott compliance
deserves more pointed inquiry than a per se rule provides.
VII.

SOVEREIGN COMPULSION

Only one case factually comparable to Bechtel has reached decision. In InteramericanRefining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,Inc. 1
the district court avoided a finding of per se illegality by recognizing sovereign compulsion as a full defense to an alleged concerted
refusal to deal. Plaintiff, an American refining concern, sued for
treble damages under the Sherman and Clayton Acts,8" alleging
that defendants had organized a "concerted boycott designed to
deny Interamerican Venezuelan crude oil required for its operations."83 The chief executive of Interamerican and another principal stockholder were considered political enemies of the Venezuelan regime in power at the time.
The Venezuelan government had granted oil production and sale
concessions to defendants, Texaco Maracaibo (Supven) and Monsanto Venezuela (Monven). Supven and Monven in turn sold to
Amoco Trading Company, an American firm operating outside
Venezuela. The Venezuelan Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons
regulates the sale of Venezuelan crude by its concessionaires. 4
Violators of the Ministry's regulations risk suspension of the concession.85 The Ministry ordered the concessionaires to prevent Venezuelan crude from reaching Interamerican, at least partly because
of the firm's connection to personnae non gratae.88 Both Supven
and Monven, along with defendant Amoco, informed Interamerican of the government's restrictions and ceased supplying the
plaintiff. Interamerican charged a group boycott.
81. Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tyson's Comer Regional Shopping Center, 429 F.2d
at 208.
82. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D.Del. 1970).

83.

15 U.S.C.

§§ 1-7, 12-27 (1976). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in

part: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of

anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor.

. .

and shall recover

threefold the damages by him sustained. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
84. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. at
1292.
85. Id. at 1294.
86. Id.
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The defendants did not deny the refusal to deal, but argued
instead that the boycott had been compelled by the Venezuelan
government, and that such foreign sovereign compulsion was a
complete defense to a Sherman Act claim. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware agreed, found the Venezuelan government had in fact compelled the defendants to boycott
Interamerican, and dismissed the complaint. Acknowledging that
Interamericanpresented a case of first impression, the court found
support for the compulsion defense in Supreme Court dicta. 7
In ContinentalOre Co. v. Union Carbideand Carbon Corp.,8" the
Canadian government had appointed Electro Met, a subsidiary of
Union Carbide, as its exclusive vanadium purchasing agent. Plaintiff, Continental Ore, alleged that Union Carbide had refused to
deal with Continental, an American vanadium dealer, in an attempt to monpolize Canadian sales for the parent Union Carbide.
The Supreme Court disallowed Union Carbide's defense that there
could be no Sherman Act violation where the defendant was
"acting in a manner permitted by.Canadian law." 9 The Court did
observe, however, that there was "no indication that . . . any
[Canadian] official . . . directed that purchases from Continen-

tal be stopped." 9 Commentators have inferred from this dictum
that the Continental Ore result might have been different if the
Canadian government had in fact directed the refusal to deal."
Similarly, in United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.," the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York faced a collective agreement among
Swiss manufacturers and certain American firms to impede the
American watch industry by suppressing the export of Swiss watch
parts. 3 An arm of the Swiss government which regulated the industry approved and encouraged the "collective," but did not require participation. 4 The district court held the defendants liable
87. The Ministry may have also desired to keep Venezuelan crude oil from
entering "unnatural" markets (Canada and Europe) and to prevent resale of the
oil at a low price by a bonded refinery such as Interamerican's.

88. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
89.

Id. at 707.

90. Id. at 706.
91. See, e.g., Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdictionand Foreign Sovereignty, 49 VA.
L. REv. 925, 934 (1963); Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 136-37 (1967).
92. [1963] TRADE CASES 70,600, at 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
93. Id. at 77,416.

94. Id. at 77,426.
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for the restraint notwithstanding its legality under Swiss law, but
again noted: "If, of course, the defendants' activities had been
required by Swiss law, this court could indeed do nothing."95
In Interamerican,the court discussed both the Continental Ore
and Swiss Watch cases, and considered "self-evident" the assumptions of both cases that acts compelled by a sovereign become acts
of the sovereign, and that "[t]he Sherman Act does not confer
jurisdiction on United States courts over acts of foreign sovereigns." 9 The court found further support in the analogous doctrine
of Parkerv. Brown" and among antitrust scholars.
The Interamericanrationale is grounded in the dual policy considerations of international comity and fairness to American firms
doing business in foreign states. American courts are reluctant to
"sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory,"99 for courts generally defer to the executive matters touching upon foreign affairs. Moreover, the
Interamericancourt thought it unfair to force American corporations operating abroad to violate the laws of the host country by
complying with domestic law.
The Bechtel defendants raised the Interamericansovereign compulsion defense as an absolute bar to Sherman Act liability.'0 Had
Bechtel gone to trial, the defendants would have argued that since
boycott compliance is commanded by the laws of the Arab nations,1 01 Bechtel could not be the subject of a Sherman Act claim. 9 2
95.

Id. at 77,456.

96. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. at
1298.
97. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker the Court held that acts performed in
compliance with a state regulatory program cannot be the basis of Sherman Act
liability. In the view of the Interamerican court, it would similarly distort the

Sherman Act and the Constitution to permit liability for acts of a foreign sovereign. 307 F. Supp. at 1298 n.18.
98. K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMm cAN BusmiNss ABROAD 94 (1958); W.
FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTrrRUST LAWS §§ 2.16, 2.17 (1958); Fugate,
supra note.91, at 932.

99. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. at 252.
100. Answer, supra note 31, paras. 16-20.
101. General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture for
Arab Countries, the Arab Boycott of Israel: Its Grounds and Regulations,
reprintedin Moss Hearings, supra note 22, at 146-49; Head Office for the Boycott
of Israel, General Secretariat, League of Arab Countries, General Principles for
Boycott of Israel (June 1972), reprinted in Church Hearings,supra note 7, at 442-

76.
102.

"It is beyond the competence and jurisdiction of United States courts to
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Commentators have previously noted important distinctions however, between the Bechtel and Interamerican facts. 10 3
Interamericanconcerned Venezuelan export regulations. The subject oil supplies were clearly within the control of the Venezuelan
government. In Bechtel, however, the commodities in trade, and
construction services and supplies are within United States control, and beyond the reach of Arab jurisdiction. Further, the plaintiff boycott victims in Interamericanoperated a bonded refinery;
the Venezuelan oil was bound for export and not intended to enter
United States commerce. By enlisting Bechtel in the boycott effort, the Arab League was able to extend its import restrictions to
United States corporations' solicitations of competing bids from
among other such firms. Bechtel thus involves a direct distortion
of the competitive process by an American national within United
States borders and a consequent interference with domestic com10 1 Finally, the profitable exmerce not present in Interamerican.
ploitation of an oil concession typically involves heavy capital expenditures by the concessionaire in the host country. The
Interamericancourt was reluctant to require the defendant to jeopardize this capital outlay. Unlike the Interamerican defendants,
Bechtel's losses, if it refused to comply with the boycott, might not
be "tantamount to expropriation."'' 5
The Interamerican court did not expressly limit its holding to
the instant facts and has been sharply criticized in this regard." 6
Interamericanalso failed to set out any more than the barest theoretical foundation for the result. The court cited several treatises
as authority for the compulsion defense, but a closer examination
indicates that these authorities"'7 would limit the availability of
adjudicate the propriety of the sovereign acts of foreign states or to interfere with
compliance by persons and firms with the laws of foreign sovereign states which
govern the business and commerce of the respective foreign states." Answer,

supra note 31, para. 28.
103. See, e.g., Kestenbaum, supra note 50, at 1425 n.83; Note, The Antitrust
Implications of the Arab Boycott, 74 MICH. L. REv. 795, 815-16 (1976); 8 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. at 818-20. See generally Note, Development of the Defense of
Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MICH. L. REv. 888 (1971).

104. See 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. at 818-20.
105. Note, The Antitrust Implications of the Arab Boycott, supra note 103,
at 816.
106. See authorities cited note 103 supra.
See note 98 supra. See also H. KRONSTEIN, J. MILLER & I. SCHWARTZ,
AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW 267 (1958); 4 BusiNEss REGULATION IN THE
COMMON MARrET A
MnucANANTrrausT LAW 238 (J. Rahl ed. 1970); Timberg,
107.

MODERN

Spring 19787

ARAB BLACKLIST

the defense to actions taken within the compelling host's jurisdiction.' 8 The Supreme Court suggested the same limitation in
ContinentalOre. 9 There is substantial authority then for an absolute defense of sovereign compulsion where the allegedly anticompetitive activity takes place within the foreign sovereign's borders.
However, since the Bechtel suit involved activities centered within
the United States, reliance on Interamericanis perhaps inappropriate. It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that vindication of the policies underlying the defense demands some form
of modified sovereign compulsion insulation in other circumstances.
VIII.

PROPOSALS FOR REASONABLENESS DETERMINATION

Between the extremes of a rigid rule of per se illegality and an
absolute defense lies the flexibility of the rule of reason. If a court
were to adopt a rule of reason approach to international political
boycotts, the reasonableness inquiry would go beyond the issue of
whether or not the particular business behavior resulted in a restraint on trade. In addition, the court would also consider whether
that practice is unreasonable in an international setting, and
whether considerations of comity render application of the federal
antitrust laws imprudent. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States calls for a similar "balancing"
approach:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of
law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct
upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law
to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) the vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in
the territory of the other state,
United States and Foreign Antitrust Laws Governing InternationalBusiness
Transactions,in A LAwYER's GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TRANSACTIONS 619,
624 (Surrey & Shaw eds. 1963); Graziano, supra note 91, at 116.

108. "If the acts are those of a foreign government within its own jurisdiction,
then the antitrust exception applies. The situation is the same if the foreign
government through its laws, regulations, or orders, requires private parties to
perform the anticompetitive acts." Fugate, supra note 91, at 932.

109. 370 U.S. at 706.
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(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state."'
A rule of reason analysis in Arab boycott cases might properly be
built around the sovereign compulsion framework.
One commentator has suggested that courts should presume the
validity of the sovereign compulsion defense."' Once the defendants have established that the alleged anticompetitive practices
were compelled by a foreign sovereign, plaintiffs would have the
burden of demonstrating that other factors outweighed the considerations of comity underlying the defense. The court, in determining whether or not to allow the defense, would apparently consider
among other factors the locus of the allegedly anticompetitive behavior, and whether or not the defendant knew that such behavior
would be compelled.' This approach thus results in too strict a
rule against compliance with trade restrictions such as the Arab
boycott.
A better approach would incorporate a similar presumption that
the defense was available to defendants compelled by a foreign
sovereign to act in violation of the antitrust laws. As indicated
earlier, substantial authority suggests that the presumption becomes conclusive where the allegedly anticompetitive conduct occurred within the foreign jurisdiction."' Bechtel could not claim
this absolute defense since its boycott activity was centered in the
United States. Even as to domestic boycott activity though, the
court should disallow the defense of sovereign compulsion only
upon a showing that domestic economic stability requires a tempering of deferential policies. In this regard, the court should consider whether the offending trade practice constitutes a serious
breach of domestic norms, and whether the quantitative impact of
the defendant's activity significantly impairs the competitive process.
The Interamericantrade restraint affected only the plaintiff
firm. Since the restriction was ordered by the Venezuelan government and did not have a significant impact on United States com110.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 40 (1965).
111. Note, Development of Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, supra note 103,
at 904-10.
112. Id.
113. See notes 107 & 108 supra.
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merce, the district court was prudent in dismissing the Sherman
Act complaint, thereby avoiding international conflict. The Arab
boycott, however, involves a substantial segment of American
trade."' A federal court would seem justified in finding antitrust
liability for implementation of the boycott through domestic conduct.
IX.

THE PROPosED Bechtel CONSENT AccoRD

The proposed accord similarly draws a sharp distinction between boycott activity within the United States and mere involvement with boycotting Arab clients. The lengthy document details
the ground rules for United States-Arab trade, and in this regard
embodies the first official statement of antitrust policy on the subject. The accord restrains Bechtel from "implementing" the boycott within the United States, but substantially qualifies this prohibition with a series of other provisions and interpretations. 15
Bechtel may not exclude any United States blacklisted person or
firm from its recommendations, evaluations, or lists of possible
suppliers in connection with a major construction project' in an
Arab League country. If from this complete list of potential subcontractors the Arab client "specifically" and "unilaterally"
chooses a particular subcontractor, ignoring all blacklisted firms,
Bechtel may still act as prime contractor.' The Justice Department does not consider Bechtel's further dealings with subcontractors, chosen on a discriminatory basis by the Arab client,
"conspiratorial action which violates antitrust law." '
If the Arab client chooses not to select one particular subcontrac114. The Justice Department stated that the Arab League countries awarded
United States prime contractors over $1 billion worth of contracts in 1974. Complaint, supra note 2, para. 9. A congressional study estimates that reported
boycott-affected transactions in 1974 covered goods and services valued at almost
$20 million. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INvsTMGATIONS OF THE HOUSE
COMM.ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 21 SEss., REPORT ON
THE ARAB Boycorr AND Az~mcAN BusINEss 10 (Subcomm. Print 1976). The Com-

merce Department places the figure for the first half of 1975 at $203 million.
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPoRT TO AccoMPANY
S. 953, S. REP. No. 632, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976).
115. Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 32, § IV(C).
116. Id. § IV(F).
117. Id. § V(C).
118. Competitive Impact Statement § V(E), United States v. Bechtel Corp.,
No. C-76-99, reprinted in 796 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-4 (Jan. 11,
1977).
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tor for each phase of a construction project, preferring merely to
"launder" the list of subcontractors originally submitted by the
prime contractor, Bechtel's responsibilities must be severely diminished. In such a situation, Bechtel must limit its activity to
advising the Arab client as to which of the subcontractors on the
list represents the best choice.' Bechtel may not proceed to solicit
bids, make a final selection from the laundered list, or even procure, in its own name or in the name of the Arab client, any goods
or services from the chosen subcontractor. Under the accord, Bechtel is also free to ignore all United States subcontractors and to
solicit bids only from non-blacklisted foreign firms operating outside the United States. Should Bechtel solicit even one United
States bid, however, the contractor can exclude no United States
firm from consideration. In distinguishing between anticompetitive conduct committed by the defendants within the United
States, and participation in Arab projects subject to discriminatory restrictions, the proposed Bechtel accord follows a pattern
20
established in a series of earlier antitrust consent decrees.Y
The importance of the Bechtel accord, then, is that it permits
United States firms to engage in trade with the vast Arab market
without fear of antitrust liability arising from a conflict of trade
laws. By withholding Sherman Act strictures from foreigncentered conduct, the accord has avoided impinging Arab sovereignty. By prohibiting discriminatory trade practices within the
United States, the accord significantly impedes the furtherance of
Arab anticompetitive objectives by United States nationals. The
focus of the accord is to encourage Arab clients to at least view the
bids and proposals of blacklisted firms, and to this end the accord
prohibits any "screening" or "gatekeeping" by Bechtel or another
United States prime contractor. Significantly, the accord does not
force an early confrontation on the boycott issue between the
United States prime contractor and the Arab client. Section V(A)
of the accord expressly permits the United States contractor to
execute a contract outside the United States, providing that the
commercial laws of the host country apply, so long as the contractor's actual performance of such a contract is within the terms of
the accord.
119. Id. at § IV(G).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., [1960] TRADE CASES 69,851,
at 77,349 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Standard Oil Co. (NS), [1960] TRADE
CASES 69,849, at 77,340 (S.D.N.Y.).
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The Bechtel accord serves the public interest by removing the
uncertainty which would arise from the prolonged delay involved
in a full trial. Such uncertainty would severely hamper American
participation in the Mid-East market.
In view of the novel, unprecedented international setting of the
Arab boycott, antitrust courts could be understandably hesitant to
apply a rule of per se illegality, preferring instead to make a deeper
inquiry into the effects of a flat prohibition on participation. The
sovereign compulsion doctrine and the Interamericanprecedent
cannot be completely disregarded. A full scale trial might foster
significant acrimony and bitterness and result in a court-imposed
sanction against Bechtel no more restrictive than the rule of the
proposed accord.
James H. Longstreet

